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The paper considers how the Treuhandanstalt's legal identity as both a public
and private entity helps to explain the process of privatization or creation of
property by the state after 1989.  I argue the agency did not easily fit within the
rigid categories of the German legal system. Moreover, its hybrid status limited
the degree to which individuals or groups could make use of the courts to hold
the agency accountable. As neither a fully public nor fully private entity, the
agency's status successfully circumvented a number of traditional forms of
control that exist in both public and private agencies in Germany. As a result,
privatization was defined in a very narrow neo-liberal sense despite what one
would predict from the standard accounts of the German Model.
Zusammenfassung
In dem Papier wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie die rechtliche Konstruktion
der Treuhandanstalt als einer sowohl staatlichen wie privaten Einrichtung dazu
herangezogen werden kann, um den Prozeß der Privatisierung wie der
Schaffung von Privateigentum durch den Staat nach 1989 zu erklären. Es wird
die Meinung vertreten, daß diese Organisationsform nur schwer in die strikten
Kategorien des deutschen Rechtssystems paßte. Darüberhinaus hat dieser
hybride Status die Möglichkeiten für Einzel- wie für Rechtspersonen  einge-
schränkt, die Treuhand vor Gericht zu belangen. Als weder „richtig“ staatliche
noch „richtig“ private Einrichtung konnten die normalerweise üblichen Formen
staatlicher wie privater Kontrolle erfolgreich umgangen werden. Daraus ist zu
folgern, daß die Privatisierung - im Gegensatz zu den Standards des „Modell
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The Treuhandanstalt . . . is a large "hit squad."
(Wächter 1993).
1. The Puzzle
How does a government voluntarily decrease its span of control during fiscal
and economic crisis? More specifically, how do governments privatize state
holdings? Conventional wisdom in the public management and privatization
literature1  tells us that the management of such enormous tasks is done poorly,
and that government strategy is likely to be inefficient.2
Work in comparative political economy also suggests that important
policies that affect large and well-organized societal interests are likely to be
inefficient.3   Interest group politics in the United States, for example, often
generates poor outcomes due to the openness of the political system.  Actors
are able to strategically exit the decision-making process and thereby
contribute to extremely low levels of trust (Badaracco 1985; Brickman 1985).  In
contrast,  the closed consensus-based politics among corporatist political
systems, such as Germany's, is characterized by a reduction of exit options
and has perhaps a higher level of trust (Katzenstein 1987).  However, such a
system is likely to function in a much slower and deliberate fashion than the
open system.  Policies may, therefore, turn out to be more accommodating than
efficient (Albert 1993; Thurow 1992).
Given these expectations in the public administration and political economy
literature about the effectiveness of public agencies, it is particularly interesting
to consider the German agency charged with the task of converting the former
East German planned economy into a form compatible with a social market
economy.  The agency’s privatization of hundreds of billions of assets following
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 demonstrates the importance of an agency's
legal status as an independent factor influencing the types of controls and
accountability exerted upon the agency. This paper describes how attention to
the legal process helps to explain the THA’s process of privatization.
                                           
1For general sampling see (Kettl 1993; Warwick 1975; Otter 1995; Drucker 1969; Gaebler
1992).
2Borrowing from Etzioni (Etzioni 1964, 8) I distinguish efficiency from effectiveness. The
former refers to the relation between a certain activity and the costs of its execution, where
as the latter concerns the goal achievement of the organization. For some of the best
argued work see (Friedman 1962) and (Tullock 1965).  For a good recent empirical study
see (Dutch 1991).
3 For a theoretical overview of the differences see the  chapters in (Berger 1981) and the
article by (Wilson 1983).2
The Treuhandanstalt (translated "Trustee Agency" and, hereafter, referred
to as the "THA") began with no organization, structure or blueprint.  Its leaders
argued for a "learning by doing" approach.  Yet, it was immediately instilled
with tremendous power and authority.   Its actions impacted not simply the 4
million workers employed in THA-owned firms4 but the firms' competitors in the
West, environmentalists, state governments, local governments, union
members, and hundreds of different clubs and organizations across the
country.   Even with planning and preparation such a task would be daunting
for any organization.   Yet, to the astonishment of  its critics and supporters, the
THA largely completed the task of privatization before closing its operation in
1994.  A single agency managed in four years to transfer into private hands
what had been the 15th largest economy in the world. At a time when
politicians in all advanced industrial countries are extremely concerned with the
growth, effectiveness and self-preserving tendencies of public bureaucracies,
the THA offers an important case study.
The shock and euphoria that accompanied unification may help to explain
the Treuhand’s initial trajectory of rapid privatization with little state
intervention. However, it is remarkable that the agency was able to largely
remain on course throughout its existence.   Rational choice explanations in
political economy or public administration concerning the development of
bureaucracies offer little help in understanding this phenomena.   Such theories
predict that governments are likely to become overbloated and inflexible in
order to serve the electoral interests of politicians as well as the interests of
powerful societal interest groups (Tullock 1965). Rational and public choice
scholarship also suggests that competition and distrust among interest groups
leads to sub-optimal outcomes (Fiorina 1979).  And, finally the natural interests
of bureaucrats to increase their budgets and span of control inevitably leads to
a perpetually inefficient and self-sustaining bureacracy (Niskanen 1971).  As a
result, one would expect the THA to quickly become victim to interest group
fighting.  Alternatively the neo-corporatist literature on the “German Model”
would also predict that the German agency would operate much more slowly
though perhaps not inefficiently (see the essays in Markovits (1982)).  Such
theories suggest that governance structure of regulation in Germany is
composed of a number of well-organized interests whose participation in the
process is institutionalized.  One would thus predict that the process of
privatization between 1989 and 1994 would at least resemble previous cases of
privatization in West Germany: that is, more deliberate and incorporate many
more interests in institutionalized settings.5
                                           
4 Firms consister largely of former East German large conglomerates (“Kombinaten”) of
smaller businesses translated literally “people-owned firms” (“Volkseigene Betriebe”).
5 For one the best historical accounts of this see  Shonfield’s chapters on Germany (Shonfield
1969).  Claus Offe, Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck have also written extensively
on the topic.3
In contrast to both the neo-corporatist and rational choice literature,
however,  what one sees is the opposite: the agency adopts a very narrow
notion of privatization and is able to maintain its course until the end.  The
agency succeeds in privatizing rapidly and making itself redundant in a
relatively short time.
1.1 The Importance of an Agency’s Legal Character
One important solution to this puzzle is the legal character of the agency.
Despite the close historic relationship between law and public administration,
legal identity is a relatively underdeveloped topic in the broad policy literature
on the THA.   Although the German legal literature served as a forum for
debate between 1990 and 1994, the debates centered on the substantive legal
position of the THA with little emphasis on the policy implications that derived
from the agency's legal character.  Moreover, the German legal literature
largely overlooked procedural aspects of the agency's legal identity. By
procedural I refer to the rules and practices in administrative and civil courts
that inform how an entity like the THA is controlled and by whom. I argue below
that procedural law is an important component in understanding the agency's
autonomy.
Why focus on these detailed German legal debates?  In his discussion of
bureaucracy Weber (1968, 24) makes a distinction between two types of
rationality: instrumental (“zweckrational”) and goal-rational.  The former reflects
a concern for the efficiency of the process by trying to determine the best
method of completing a given part of a larger task.  Alternatively, with goal-
rational or substantive rationality, an individual strives to evaluate in one
composite calculus the goals, means, and possible secondary consequences
of her actions. An analysis of the legal character provides a better
understanding of the THA's instrumental rationality.  It provides a map of the
legal constraints and parameters within which policy makers operate.  Such an
analysis highlights the idea that public agencies do not exist in a vacuum but
are institutions embedded in social frameworks governed by complicated legal
systems.
1.2 The Argument
The Treuhandanstalt's legal identity as both a public and private legal entity
helps to explain the process of privatization or creation of property by the state
after 1989.  As neither a fully public nor fully private entity, the agency's status
successfully circumvented a number of traditional forms of control that exist in
both public and private agencies in Germany.  As a result, privatization was4
defined in a very narrow neo-liberal sense despite what one would predict from
the standard accounts of the German Model.
Three important features distinguish the public sector accountability and
control in Germany.   First, the majority of public administration is delegated to
local and state levels.  The decentralization of the state's activities insures that
implementation of policy is tailored to the specific needs of the region and by
those with knowledge about the area.   Citizens, in turn, are able to hold either
local or state level officials accountable who, in turn, place pressure on
representatives in parliament.6
Second, the participation of well-organized interested is institutionalized in
the policy process.  This is most evident in wage-policy where centralized
industrial unions, business associations and government work out policies in a
very formalized process. 7 Although one should exercise caution about over-
romanticizing these relationships,  it often nevertheless means: 1)  that those
affected by a public policy such as unions, state governments and para-public
organizations are often included in the decision making and oversight process;
2) their ability to leave the process is limited; and 3) decisions are made by
consensus. Following an often time-consuming and laborious process,
opposing interests achieve a compromise or no policy is made.  Importantly,
through the institutionalization, parties share a stake in making sure the policy
works.
Finally, a third characteristic of the German Model is an administrative and
civil legal system based on “a rule of law.” Germany's legal culture emboddied
in the concept of the "Rechtsstaat"  means that the state is not simply an
enforcer of laws but also the independent arbiter of the public interest.   The
system emboddies the separation of politics and administration that Luther
Gulick, Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow advocated in the United States a
century earlier.   The material expression of the Rechtstaat is the development
of Germany's Basic Law8 and Constitutional Court (Smith 1979, 186-88; Dyson
1992, 87).   Judges' ruling are based on the application of specific cases to the
law[s] rather than on the concept of stare decisis.   Similarly, bureaucrats -- as
agents of the state -- also enjoy a great deal of autonomy  in the application of
specifics cases to the laws.
                                           
6 A classic example of this in action is the recent change in Germany’s Asylum Law.  Until two
years ago the country had one of the most liberal constitutional guarantees of asylum in the
world.   However, after local and state institutions complained bitterly that they were being
taken advantage of, the law was changed and made relatively restrictive (Cassell 1994).
7It is important to note that not all affected interests are incorporated. Moreover, the degree to
which all parties are brought together varies by sector.  Nevertheless, the general German
corporatist model has a set of actors such as state governments in the Bundesrat actively
involved in the development of federal policies which the states in turn must implement.
8 Also known in German as the Grundgesetz  or G.G..5
The following paper addresses the third feature, namely the Treuhand's
position in Germany's Rechtsstaat.9  The agency does not easily fit within the
rigid categories of the German legal system.  It is given a hybrid status which
limits the degree to which individuals or groups can make use of the courts to
hold the agency accountable.  An understanding of the legal status helps to
explain how the agency is able to operate more freely than either public or
private entities despite expections concerning the influence of external
pressures created by the agency's actions.
Such a freedom steers the agency into the waters between Scylla and
Charybda: it offers the great potential for innovation while posing the equally
great threat of loss of control and accountability.  The focus of this paper is on
the way in which the legal character opens up opportunities for both
alternatives.  While I focus only on the THA the contribution is intended to
extend more broadly to the conditions under which radical institutional
innovation can occur. The paper demonstrates that when public or private
actors fall outside of the standard legal categories of German law, an
opportunity is created to act in very different ways than what one would be
predict from standard assumptions about the German Model (Casper 1995).
1.3 Outline of Paper
The following continues in Section II,  with an historical description of the
Treuhandanstalt's development.  The purpose is it provide the necessary
background with which to understand  how the agency's instrumental rationality
was defined during its genesis (Section III).   In Section IV I then describe the
THA's legal character in terms of the transfer of assets to the private sector and
the management of firms prior to their sale.  The aim is to then link the legal
discussion back to the THA’s instrumental rationality.  Section V concludes the
paper with statements about how substantive and procedural aspects of the
THA's legal identity impact the policy making process.
                                           
9 The application of features one and two to the Treuhandanstalt were partly addressed in an
earlier paper (Cassell 1996).6
2. The Treuhandanstalt: a brief history10
The legal development of the Treuhandanstalt occured in three stages that
correspond with three important laws (Kloefper 1996). The stages are not neat
junctures but tend to overlap one another. The first phase began on March
1,1990, with the German Democratic Republic government's passage of the
law11 creating the "Anstalt zur treuhändische Verwaltung des Volkseigentums
(Treuhandanstalt)" and a Conversion Ordinance12  that provided for the
conversion of communist economic units into organizational structures under
private law.13  Once converted into private assets, the Treuhandanstalt became
the sole owner in most cases.
The agency's lengthy title reflects the tenor of its initial mandate: to act as
trustee of the East German public holdings during the transition to a more
market-oriented system.  The emphasis in the original text of the March 1 law
was less on privatization than on the administration of assets in the interest of
East Germans.  There was a strong concern among those who had brought
down the East German totalitarian regime that West German speculators would
soon cross the border and take advantage of East Germany's vulnerable
position (see Kemmler 1994; Schröder 1993; Kloefper 1996).    In line with the
GDR reformers' antipathy toward a centralized government apparatus,
reformers in the Volkskammer envisioned the THA as a decentralized agency
organized around a central office in Berlin and 15 regional offices whose
jurisdictions corresponded with the GDR's 15 sub-national governmental units
or "Bezirke".  The participants of the Round Table discussions, which gave birth
to the concept of the THA,  attempted to create an alternative to East and West
Germany's political and economic systems. They hoped a decentralized
organization would allow the agency to operate in the most efficient manner
even as it protected East German interests.14
The second phase of the THA's development began with the victory of the
conservative Christian Democratic Party in East Germany's first (and last) free
                                           
10There are numerous accounts of the Treuhand's development. Some are more critical than
others.  For several excellent accounts of the development of the Treuhand during this early
period, covering a range of perspectives see (Kemmler 1994; Wächter 1993; Seibel 1992;
Priewe 1993; Schröder 1993).
11Law is entitled, "Beschluss zur Gruendung der Anstalt zur treuhaendischen Verwaltung des
Volkseigentums" Gesetzblatt der DDR 1990 I.
12Ordinance on the conversion of state-owned industrial combines, companies, and
organization into joint-stock companies. Gesezblatt I, 107 [1 March 1990].
13The conversion ordinance sets into motion the transformation of  East Germany's
Volkseigene Betriebe and Kombinanten into limited partnership firms (Gesellschaften mit
beschränkte Haftung, "GmbH") or stockholding companies (Aktiengesellschaft) respectively.
For details of how this was done see (Elsner 1990), (Rosener 1990) and (Horn 1991).
14For a good account of the Round Table and its focus on the Treuhandanstalt see (Rose
1990).7
election on March 18, 1990 and the subsequent appointment of Lothar de
Maizière as Minister President of East Germany.  De Maizière and his cabinet,
in contrast to participants of the Round Table discussions, worked to shift the
Treuhand's strategy and structure toward a more clearly  market-oriented
outcome with goal of privatization at the forefront.   With a conservative
Volkskammer to support him,  De Maizière succeeded in passing the "Gesetz
zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermögens" (Law of
the Privatization and Reorganization of Publicly-owned Assets, hereafter,
referred to as the "THG") on June 17, 1990.15  The new law voided the earlier
law and -- along with five Implementation Ordinances16  --  reformulated the
THA's responsibilities and structure.
Even the title suggests a very different agency. The preamble of the new
law mandated the THA to transfer public assets to private legal entities or
natural persons as swiftly as possible and, to the greatest possible extent, by
selling them.  The new law also called for a restructuring of the agency into four
private stock-holding companies ("Aktiengesellschaften" or AGs) to insure that
the task of privatization would not be jeopardized or slowed down by political
influence.  In their explanation for why the stock-holding company form was
adopted Fischer and Schröder (1993, 33) note simply, "AG's were considered
to be more flexible and more able to take actions than institutions under public
law."  The second phase is thus characterized by a reorientation and
restructuring of the agency toward the goal of privatization.
A third phase of the THA's development began in the summer of 1990 and
concluded with the Unification Treaty that took effect October 3, 1990.  During
this period West German government and business leaders significantly
extended their influence over the Treuhandanstalt.   The question was no
longer whether East and West Germany would unite but rather the terms and
conditions under which unification would occur.   The Kohl government in Bonn
wanted to make certain it was not saddled with the long term responsibility of
restructuring the eastern states.  The strategy of the conservative majority in
the West German parliament (CSU/CDU/FDP) reflected a neo-liberal
orientation that emphasized minimal state involvement and private markets as
the solution to redevelopment of the east.17
West Germany's influence on the THA is apparent during this period in at
least two ways. On July 15, 1990 Detlev Rohwedder, the second president of
                                           
15Gesetzblatt I, 300 (17 June 1990).
161st Implementation Ordinance to the THG (15 August 1990), Gesetzblatt der DDR I, 1076;
2nd Implementation Ordinance to the THG (22 August 1990), Gesetzblatt der DDR I, 1260;
3rd Implementation Ordinance to the THG (29 August 1990), Gesetzblatt der DDR I, 1333;
4th Implementation Ordinance to the THG (12 September 1990), Gesetzblatt der DDR I,
1465; 5th Implementation Ordinance to the THG (12 September 1990) Gesetzblatt DDRI,
1466.
17 For a good account of the economics see (Sinn 1992).8
the THA and former executive at Hoesch AG in Dortmund, succeeded in
establishing a "western business majority" on the Executive Committee of the
THA. That is, Rohwedder succeeded in insuring that a majority on the
executive board of the THA would be western business leaders with experience
in either firm restructuring or privatization. Moreover, these were business
leaders with a strong personal stake in East Germany’s transformation.18
Kemmler (1994, 197) notes that De Maizière's initial concept was to have the
committee divided equally between east and west Germans to insure that "half
understood where we had been and half where we were going."
A second show of West German influence occurred in the structure of the
agency.  In what Wolfgang Seibel describes as a “coup,”  Rohwedder
unilaterally disregarded the THG's mandate of the stock company model and
opted to go with a centralized and highly autonomous agency under public law
(Seibel 1996).  "Life comes first and then the legal paragraphs" ("Erst komme
das Leben, dann die Paragraphen") explained Rowedder in a speech before
the Volkskammer in September 1990.  Numerous explanations have been
given for this move. Some suggest that the stock-holding company model was
simply not feasible or practical given the nature of  corporate law in Germany.19
Rohwedder argued that the process of transforming the agency into stock-
holding companies would lose too much time in setting up the institutions.
Others point to the strong influence of labor on stock-holding company boards
(through Germany's co-determination laws) as explanation for Rohwedder's
reluctance.  A THA employee, who began his tenure in the agency in mid-1991
in Dresden and still works in the agency's internal controlling department,
recalls very clearly Rohwedder's decision:20 "In the beginning the Treuhand law
stated the agency was to form into four stock-holding companies. Thank God
Rohwedder did not form the the stock-holding companies. It would have meant
the unions and the SPD would have been involved in the process. Unions and
the SPD were more interested in restructuring than privatizing.  If the stock-
holding companies had been formed the THA would still be around today."
                                           
18 For instance, (Suhr 1991, 87) notes that Rohwedder’s first executive  committee meeting
consisted of the following members: Hans-Olaf Henkel, President (Vorsitzender) of IBM;
Claus Köhler, Director of the Deutsche Bundesbank; Andrè Leysen, executive  committee
president of AGFA Gavaert;  Frank Niethammer, Head of AIGV AG; Klaus Piltz, CEO of
VEBA AG, Horst Pastuszek, on the managing committee of Tchibo Holding, and Jochen
van Tilburg, CEO of Grundig.
19 This point was made to me by numerous German Bundestag Parliamentarians who served
on the Treuhand oversight committees from both the SPD and the CDU parties.
20The interviewee was one of the young employees hired straight out of college to work in
administration and management of firms (Begleitung und Beteiligung) at the regional office
in Dresden .  He now works in the central office performing audits on firms and the
Treuhand successor organization the Bundesanstalt fuer vereinigungsbedingte
Sonderaufgaben (BvS).9
Whatever the reason, the move clearly reflected an increase in control by West
German business and government leaders.21
The Unification Treaty solidified the West German government's control
over the  Treuhand.   The Treaty established the Treuhand as a federal trust
agency (Bundesunmittelbare Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts § 25.Abs.1 Satz 2
EV).   Much like an American "public corporation," the "Anstalt" designation
gave the agency more administrative independence than is typical for federal
or state bureaucracies in Germany.22   Nevertheless, the Treuhandhandanstalt
became a federal public entity whose mandate was spelled out in the Treuhand
Act and the Unification Treaty. The mandates included:
· privatization through the sale of either whole or partial firms as swiftly as
possible;23
· securing the competitiveness and efficiency of firms and other market
structures through restructuring and investment;24
· closure of firms not capable of being restructured and the subsequent
sale of firm assets in bankruptcy proceedings.25
As the short list illustrates, the THA became the primary government
institution in the  redevelopment of the eastern states' economies. 26
With an understanding of the THA’s early development one can begin to
appreciate the instrumental rationality that informs the process of privatization.
The following section describes how privatization or the creation of property is
                                           
21The minority report of a Parliamentary Investigatory Committee also concluded that West
German governement officials were actively involved prior to unification  in insuring that the
THA's reconstruction efforts be kept to a minimum and that the influence of unions and
parliament on the agency's activities also be constrained to a minimum [Treuhandanstalt,
1995 #238, Vol. 14, p.120).
22In particular, a central component of this autononmy is that an “Anstalt” may adopt its own
particular system of governance.  The Treuhandanstalt adopted the governance structure of
a private holding.  Another Anstalt, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, uses a different governing
structure that incorporates much broader representation. For several excellent discussions
of the history of public trustee agencies in Germany see (Krebs, 1985) and (Rüfner, 1985).
The THA’s federal status is also unique in Germany where -- with exception of the
Bundesbank and Bundesbahn -- most adminisrative tasks are done by state and local
governments.
23Preamble of the THG
24§ 2 section 6 THG.  This is, however, specifically not seen by the agency or the executive as
a general economic mandate or mandate to pursue regional economy policy [Wild, 1991
#126].
25§ 8 section 1 THG
26For a more complete list see (Kloefper 1996, pp. 49-54) and(Wächter 1993).10
defined by the THA.  It also develops a schema that helps to understand what
exactly was at stake in the process.
 3. Privatization: narrow but costly
The most important question in 1990 concerned the content of privatization and
the types of control and influence.  A crucial consideration is that at the time
most observers excepted East Germany's assets to be worth anywhere from
600 billion27 to a trillion German Marks.28  Government officials at the state and
national level assumed that unification could be bought with  East Germany's
assets (Suhr 1991).  In November 1990, for example, Helmut Kohl emphasized
in a televised speech that no one would suffer in eastern Germany from the
introduction of the market economy and no additional taxes would be
necessary to finance German unity (Kohl 1990; Krumrey 1992, 74).  Kohl’s
statement was partly political rhetoric but was also based in part on the premise
that the sale of East Germany’s economy would more than pay for the process
of unification.  In the end, because of a collapse of east European markets and
a complete over-estimation of the value of firms, the bill for the privatization
effort will certainly exceed 300 billion marks (approximately $250 billion).
Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that in 1990, the debates about the
control and policy of the Treuhand were based on an enormous false sense of
worth.
The debates over the Treuhand and its policy are complex and cover a
wide range of different asset types and industrial sectors.  A number of authors
have delved into different aspects of the agency's policies toward various
sectors.29   To make sense of the larger debates at the time the Treuhand was
taking form, it is useful to simplify matters somewhat.  I think of instrumental
rationality, that is the logic of the process of privatization, in terms of two
variables: control and policy.  Each consists of a narrow or a broad dimension.
Control could be placed in the hands of a very small number of interests or
shared among a broad section of the population.  Correspondingly privatization
can be defined:  in very narrow terms, whereby the state's strategy is to transfer
assets to the private sector as quickly as possible in order to allow market
forces to take hold;   or in broad terms with a more involved state and property
defined in more complex ways that help assist the state in directly attempting to
develop a regional economy  (Salzgitter AG, Deutsche Industrie Anlagen
                                           
27Detlev Rohwedder stated in October 1990 with confidence, "Der ganze Salat ist 600
milliarden wert" ("The whole salad is worth 600 billion") (Wehner 1991, 28; Czada 1994).
28Estimated by the Modrow government in 1989.
29 For various studies see (Griffen 1994; Deeg 1993; Carlin 1994).11




Policy Broad 1 2
Narrow  3 4
In 1990, many argued that control30 should be shared among a broad range of
actors.  Suggestions along these lines included the creation of mini-Treuhands
in each state government.  The Treuhand Act passed in June 1990, calls for
the creation of four stock-holding companies.  Unions and States also called for
greater participation.  The organizational structure prior to the second
Treuhand Act was a loosely linked decentralized agency with assets divided
among the 15  governmental units of East Germany.  All of these reflect a
broadening of control and influence.
In contrast,  West German government and western business leaders
pressed for a much narrower set of controls with clear lines of authority.   They
argued that the process of privatization would become excessively politicized
unless control could be kept centralized and limited to a few select individuals.
In addition to control, there was also a debate over the policy of
privatization.31    Numerous groups and scholars in 1990 called for the
Treuhandanstalt to recognize its position as the most important instrument for
the reconstruction and redevelopment of East Germany (Engholm 1991; PDS
1994; Sinn 1992; Scheifele 1991).  They argued that the Treuhand must accept
its role and develop strategies for the improvement of regional economies
rather than focussing solely on individual privatizations.  Conservative and
Liberal Party members countered that a broad notion of privatization was
unrealistic, inefficient and extremely time-consuming. The Treuhand,
conservatives argued, must concentrate singularly on transferring public
holdings to the private sectors as quickly as possible. The market mantra
                                           
30I use the term “control” as the direct influence over policy.
31(Jens 1993)describes the debate as between gradualism and shock therapy.12
echoed in Bonn and in the West German business community was
“Privatization is the best form of reconstruction.”32
In theory each of the four boxes were possible, in practice only 1 and 4
were likely in 1990.   A broad control of the process would have made it
extremely difficult to insure that privatization take on a very limited neo-liberal
market form.   While box Number 2, a narrow policy influence and broad
definition of privatization, was possible, it had few supporters.  Public debates
in 1990 centered around boxes 1 and 4: would the THA be the instrument for
redeveloping East Germany which would require a longer term involvement by
the state33 or would it take the neo-liberal path of quick privatization with
minimal state involvement?
The agency's initial trajectory was, in part, solved by its legal designation in
October 1990 with the development of the Unification Treaty.  Article 25 of the
Unification Treaty establishes the THA as a trustee agency subordinate to the
Ministry of Finance34  headed by Theo Waigel, member of Bavaria's
conservative Christian Socialist Union party.   Waigel was a strong advocate
for the neo-liberal version of privatization.  He argued the agency must
maintain the narrow course of privatization in its action and public rhetoric.35
An official statement from the Kohl government captures the narrow
construction of  privatization: “The Treuhand does not practice any active
regional or structural politics.  The regional and social effects from our
privatization of firms are made with the close consideration of the interests of
federal and state governments”36 (Bundesregierung 1992, 8).  The statement
points out that although the Kohl government recogonized that its actions had
regional effects for segments of the economy, the agency was to eschew any
suggestion of direct responsibility for "structural politics" in the East.  Regional
and structural politics is the domain of state governments.  The fate of
particular THA firms, in turn, was to be based  on the dymics of the market
coupled with  the abilities and skills of the buyers or the managment in the firms
themselves.  The THA's strategy was to keep a careful distance from its
subsidiary firms, stressing the necessity for firms to make it on their own in the
new market environment.
                                           
32"Privatisierung ist die beste Sanierung." This phrase is attributed to Detlev Rohwedder (FAZ
19 Dec. 1991, 13).
33Position of the opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party, PDS and Green Party.
34The Ministry of Finance bears the primary legal and policy responsibility for the agency. The
Ministry of Economics may give guidance on the THA's policy issues but is not the legal
overseer.
35 Seibel, in fact, argues convincingly that the federal government used the  THA as a
scapegoat or lighting rod to take the heat for the narrow privatization policies (Seibel 1992).
36 Translation by the  author.  The original reads: "Die Treuhandanstalt betriebt keine aktive
Regional- und Strukturpolitik. Die regionalen und sozialen Auswirkungen der
Unternehmensprivatisierung werden in enger Abstimmung mit Bund und Laendern . . .
jedoch berüksichtigt."13
Interestingly, after the Unification Treaty was signed, unions and state
governments were incorporated into the decision-making process at the
federal37 and regional level.38 However, the THA (with the federal government
at its back) never relinquished control of the privatization process.  The THA's
strategy was to retain control and maintain its course by extending side-
payments and consessions to unions39 and state government leaders40  at
various points in response to external pressures (Wieczorek 1992).41   
In sum, the Treuhandanstalt evolved from an agency charged with
administering East German assets in the interest of East Germans to a sales
agency with enormous autonomy in achieving a very narrow neo-liberal notion
of privatization.    In the end -- after four and half years -- the THA paid a great
deal to remain in box No. 4.  Among the subsidies spent by the THA includes
more than 100 billion marks just for the wages of employees in firms which
were not able to be privatized right away (Czada 1994, 218).42  With the
exception of several large politically sensitive industries, such as chemical,
steel and ship building,  the agency's unwavering strategy throughout its
existence was to give limited-term financial assistance to assets determined
viable until they could be sold to private investors.  Assets determined to be
non-viable were shut down and placed in a liquidation process.  When it began
its operation 4 million people worked for approximately 13,000 Treuhand firms
comprising over half the East German work force.  Within a year over 2 million
employees had been laid off (Wahse 1994; Czada 1994).
The shock of unification and weakness of state governments in the East
(Seibel 1994) may help explain the Kohl government’s ability to place the THA
in Box No. 4 initially.  What is remarkable, however, is that the agency did not
drift into Box No. 1 over time as governmental institutions began to develop,
deindustrialization spread and unemployment began to increase rapidly.
                                           
37 Following unification, three union representatives and each of the five ministers of the
former-East German state governments are given seats on the Treuhandanstalt’s Executive
Committee.  There are also committees set up at each of the THA’s regional offices that
include members of labor.
38The Treuhand's regional offices also had "Wirtschaftsbeiraete" (economics councils)
associated with them which would be advise by the Treuhand about upcoming privatization
decisions or problem privatizations.
39Interviews with the leadership of IG Metall and IG Chemie confirm this point.  In response to
several well-publicized strikes, the THA agreed to invest in make-work and training
programs ("Arbeitsbeschaffungmasnahmen" ABM and ABS) as well an increase in the social
plans implemented after employees were layed-off (Rabe 1995).
40Interviews with state government leadership in Brandenburg confirms this points.  State
governments such as Sachsen succeeded in pressuring the Treuhand to participate in
restructuring programs (Kern 1993), as well as, committing the agency to "save" certain
industries such as steel, ship building and chemicals.
41 For a description see (Lichtblau 1993) and (Petra Naujoks 1992).
42 For a good account of the finances see (Lichtblau 1993).14
From 1990 until Birgit Breuel (successor to Rohwedder) symbolically pulled
off the sign outside the THA’s headquaters of the Leipziger Straße building in
1994 the agency was able to essentially remain on course.43    Tables 1 gives
an overview of the THA's inventory over time.
Table 1: Cumulative Treuhand activity from 1990 to 1994.
12/31/9 12/31/9 12/31/9 12/31/9 12/31/9
Privatizations (includes partial) 681 4683 11043 13643 15102
Remaining Privatizations 7648 5811 2575 951 192
Employment guarantees (1000) 255 930 1400 1490 1510
Investment guarantees (DM billion) 50 114 170 187 211
Source: Treuhandanstalt Year-end Reports
On December 31, 1994 -- four years after starting from scratch -- the THA shut
down having liquidated or sold 95 percent of its portfolio.  The agency either
sold or placed in liquidation more than 13,000 firms.  Millions of acres of land
and real estate were sold or turned over to local and state governments. The
federal government collected more than  DM 50 million from the sale of firms
and secured more than DM 200 billion in investment and 1.5 million jobs from
private investors.
The following suggests how the legal position contributed independently to
this process of privatization.
                                           
43This is a controversial point.  A number of scholars have suggested that the THA changed
course in 1992 and began to favor reorganization over privatization.  The evidence to
support this is weak however.   The development of the Management Company Limited
Partnerships (MgKGs) was in line with the THA initial strategy of quick privatization. From
the point of view of the THA, once an asset was transferred to a  MgKG it was considered
sold and off the books of the Treuhand.   Restructuring programs such as ATLAS  in
Sachsen-Anhalt or the subsidizaton of the chemical industry in Bitterfeld were developed
because of political pressure from the outside.  The THA was successful in isolating those
initiatives from its general policy.  An assistant to the executive committee stated in an
interview:  "The Treuhand never changed its policy of quick privatization.  There was never
a change in course.  Breuel was pressured to spend more on restructuring. In response she
shifted some of the money  that had previous gone to subsidize an investor and,  just before
the sale, shifted it to the firm in order to appear to be spending more money on the
restructuring.  But in reality the policy that investors who buy the property should be the
ones making the restructuring decisions never changed: the money was still paid to the
investor at the point of sale."  A recently complete dissertation on the topic of the
Management KGs also confirms the point (Bensberg 1996).15
4. Treuhandanstalt: both a public and private entity
Legally speaking, the Treuhand existed at the juncture between public and
private law.44 Article 25 of the Unification Treaty placed the agency under
public law through its designation as a federal trustee agency.45  The agency’s
mandates to privatize and restructure an economy were also clearly public
goods designed to serve a public function.46  On the other hand,  the agency
operated and acted as a private "holding" company responsible for thousands
of subsidiary stock-holding companies and limited partnership firms.  Birgit
Breuel, the THA's longest standing president, argued on numerous occasions
that the Treuhand was not a bureaucracy but a firm.  I interviewed more than a
dozen "privatization agents" and each one echoed Breuel's argument that the
agency was not a bureaucracy but operated like a company.   Even its internal
managerial structure and 15 regional offices ("Niederlassungen")47 resembled
the structure of a German stock-holding company.48  Moreover, the agency's
relationship to buyers of assets was sanctioned not with public agreements but
with private contracts and included clauses that very much resembled the deals
private brokers make.
This dual character triggers two questions.  First, is the agency a private
holding company answerable to the standards of Germany's corporate laws or
a public agency answerable to the standards and rules of public agencies?
And second, how does this distinction alter the agency's definition of and
approach to privatization?
No clear consensus exists in the German legal literature over the
substantive legal position of the THA in either private or public law.49  Some
scholars (Krebs 1990) argue that the decisions of the THA are solely
administrative acts.  For example, the agency's decision to provide liquidity to
firms through direct subsidies or guaranteed loans, or the decision to privatize,
clearly affects a larger public.  The THA's actions should, therefore,  be subject
to the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.   A second position is that the
                                           
44See also (Stechow 1991), (Stechow 1991).
45(Weimar 1993) notes, "The Treuhandanstalt is a trustee agency under public law responsible
to the federal government but also the sole shareholder of private companies converted
from the former 'people-owned' economic entities" (1).  Author's translation of the following
description, "Die Treuhandanstalt -- bundesunmittelbare Anstalt des oeffentlichen Rechts --
ist Anteilseignerin der bisher nicht privatisierten Kapitalgesellschaften, die im Zuge der
treuhandgesetzlichen Umwandlung der volkseigenen Wirtschaftseinheit enstanden sind."
46See also the decision in the Kammergericht of Berlin, NJW 1991, 360; the Administrative
Court of Berlin, NJW 1991, 376; and High Administrative Court of Berlin NJW 1991, 715.
47Interestingly the offices had been called "Geschäftstellen," a term more generally used to
refer to offices of a bureaucracy.  The name was changed to Niederlassung after unification
and is primarily used in the private sector to refer to branches of a company.
48With the notable exception of the labor's equal representation in the executivate committee.
49See (Stechow 1991)  and (Weimar 1993) for a review.16
THA operates in a special category of law between public and private, namely
administrative private law ("Verwaltungsprivatrecht")  (Weimar 1993). In this
sense, public agencies pursue a public mandate in the form of private rather
than public law. The venue is the private civil courts but the agency remains
accountable to the norms and standards of public law50, that is those laws
typically judged in the administrative courts. 51   In particular, the agency should
be held to § 3 of the Basic Law which guarantees equal treatment under the
law (Scheifele 1991). 52
A third position is the so-called "two-stage approach" ("zwei-stufen Lehre"
of administrative law developed shortly after the Second World War and
applied to state subsidies for housing construction and farming (Ipsen 1956,
62).   Following this approach the THA's actions can be divided into two parts.
First is the decision-making process; "the whether, to whom and at what price"
a property should be sold.  The second part is the contract which sanctions the
privatization decision.  Under the two-stage theory, the former is an
administrative action judged under standards of public law, whereas the latter
should be judged solely under private law (Fahrenbach 1990).   A final position
is taken by Weides who argues that since the THA is not handing out any
public goods through the sale of properties in the market, it should be judged
solely under the standards of private law (Weides 1991).
In order to make sense of this confusion and its application to public
administration it is helpful to think of the THA's legal status relative to external
and internal actors and then ask how they impact the THA's instrumental
rationality.  The former refers to the THA’s relationship to groups external to the
agency (“Treuhandaußenrecht”) but with whom the agency comes into contact
while fulfilling its legislative mandate.  The latter refers to the Treuhand’s legal
identity in relation to the firms and assets in its possession
(“Treuhandinnenrect”) Stechow and Kerber 1991a;  Stechow and
Kerber1991b).  Again, how do these different identities play out under private
and public law?  And second, what difference does the distinction make for
public administration?
                                           
50 In particular, the agency should be held to § 3 of the Basic Law which guarantees equal
treatment under the law (Scheifele 1991).
51 It is important to distinguish another case: namely when an agency pursues a private goal
such as the purchase of a car or the lease of property.  Such a case falls under the  legal
concept of  “fiskalische Hilfsgeschäfte der Verwaltung”  (Fiscal transactions that aid in the
administration).  The agency is held by the standards of private law in the civil court.
52 See (Krebs 1990) for a critique.17
4.1 External Legal Character
Despite its trustee designation in the THG, the German courts determined that
the Treuhand fell within the jurisdiction of private law in carrying out its
privatization mandate.  Questions and complaints over the THA's sale of assets
are thus the jurisdiction of the civil courts.   To consider what this means it is
useful to compare the different  scenarios mentioned by various legal scholars
(see Table 2).   Control and accountability of the THA are associated with at
least two factors: standing (who can sue) and the legal basis on which a suit
may be filed, which concerns the extent to which one can make claims based
on public and private responsibilities.   Both dimensions define legal
parameters that contribute to the THA's accountability.  Standing determines
the population that can hold the agency accountable whereas legal basis
determines the range of issues for which the agency can be held accountable.
Table 2: Legal Status of the THA to External Actors
Standing  Legal Basis
Private Law
(Weides)




 Broad  Broad includes the
agency’s public mandates
(“Hoheitliche Aufgagen”)




 Narrow Broad and includes in
particular  § 3 GG
The position that the THA should be treated as an entity under private law is
argued by Weides and Manfred Balz, Legal Director in the Treuhandanstalt.
Under private law, the conditions under which someone may sell a product are
very broad.  The sellers enjoy a great deal of freedom in terms of who and
under what conditions they wish to sell. Consequently, a plantiff's ability to
question such decisions is limited.  Claims are largely limited to questions of
contract law: whether the Treuhand or the buyer has fulfilled obligations written
in the contract or if the seller misrepresents a property during the sales process
(Weimar 1993 13).  In addition, the population which can sue is also relatively
narrow.  In Germany suits can be brought only by those affected by the actions
of the defendant. In practice, this means that the agency is held accountable, in
this instance, only by those with whom it makes a contract.
Other scholars argue that the THA's decision concerning the terms of
privatization should be considered an administrative act and judged under the
norms of public law (Stechow and Kerber 1991a and 1991b; Krebs 1990).18
They argue that the agency is subject to §40 VwGO which holds an agent of
the state accountable to all the rules of public law.53 (Stechow and Kerber
1991b, 52) for example, argue that in its sales activities the THA is fulfilling a
set of public mandates.  Privatization affects the entire economic structure of
the region and thus impacts actors other than just the buyer.  As a result the
legal relationship to external actors ("Treuhandaußenrecht") should be
considered under public law and under the jurisdiction of the administrative
courts.
Generally speaking the difference between private and public law is
whether I have to give reasons for my decision. In private law I am considered
an autonomous subject who need not give any reason.  In public law I must
give reasons, and those have to be legal. For instance, a public agent cannot
simply prefer one group over another because that would violate §3 GG.   As a
public actor, therefore, the THA is more constrained.  There is a broader basis
upon which to file claims against the agency.   Furthermore, standing in the
administrative court is granted to a wider audience than simply the purchaser.
The population extends not just to the buyers but also to disappointed buyers,
communities and other groups affected by the decision.  They may call into
question whether the THA's decision is in line with the public goals mandated
in the Unification Treaty and the Treuhandgesetz.
As a public entity operating under the norms of private law -
Verwaltungsprivatrecht  --   the THA is tied to various public laws but its actions
are evaluated in the private courts.  Its most important public constraint is a
guarantee of equal treatment under the law (§ 3 GG).  Disappointed buyers,
therefore, have standing in the court. In practice, however, it is extremely
difficult to hold the THA accountable under §3 GG because of the vagueness of
the Treuhand Act.  In other words, in order to argue a claim under § 3 GG, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that there were clear violations of the sales priorities
written into the THA.  There were, however, no priorities given in the THG
concerning how to privatize. Moreover, for the first two years there were only
informal priorities developed for determining to whom and under what terms to
sell a property. As a result, very few are successful in making such a claim in
the civil courts.
Although the German courts initially favored the THA's public status, the
Treuhand eventually succeeded in establishing its position as a private entity.
The Chamber Court of Berlin54 (Kammergericht) ruled the sale of assets is a
public act in line with § 40 I VwGO55 and is, therefore, the jurisdiction of the
                                           
53 The reasoning behind the justification is more  complex than presented here.  For a detailed
account of the various justifications see (Weimar 1991, 815)
54KG (5 December 1990) ZIP 1991, 407.
55Unlike the United States where a single Administrative Procedures Act is applied, Germany
has two different laws for the administrative procedures. The VwGO,
Verwaltungsgerichtordung and the VwVfG, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (both translated19
administrative courts.  Similarly, the Administrative Court of Berlin56 ruled that
external complaints against the THA fall within the domain of the Administrative
Courts. The court argued the defendant was a federal agency whose task of
rebuilding the economy clearly fell into the domain of the state. The court noted
"the sale of properties is done for economic as well as politically structural
reasons" and was therefore -- even in its sales activities -- a public enterprise
(NJW 1991, 377).  
The administrative court decision was appealed to the High Administrative
Court of Berlin.57  The High Court overturned the decision of the lower court
arguing that the agency was clearly acting as a private actor in its sales
activities.  The agency's legislative mandate was to sell properties as quickly as
possible and to operate in a "business-like" fashion.  The agency was therefore
answerable to the laws of economics and the social market economy. It
activities are of a completely private-law nature and are thus the jurisdiction of
the civil courts.
The implications of this high court ruling are even more significant given
the procedural differences between civil and administrative courts.  Civil courts
in Germany are designed to adjudicate differences between two adversarial
equals. The judge's role is presumed to be similar to referee whose ability to
collect evidence and ask questions is limited by the Verhandlungsmaxime
(Marx 1985, 49). Marx describes the Verhandlungsmaxime as judges being
required to take a "passive" position with regard to the process and in particular
the evidentiary proceedings.  Under the Verhandlungsmaxime judges can not,
for example, go beyond evidence presented by the parties in the court.
This stands in stark contrast to the administrative courts where the
Untersuchungsmaxime is the norm that guides judges' behavior and evidentiary
proceedings. The assumption behind Administrative courts is that judges must
decide between two unequals: the state and the individual party subordinate to
the state.  As Smid notes: Administrative courts are their “in order to eliminate
the inequality that exists between citizen and bureaucracy which in turn derive
from the subordinate legal structures” (Smid 1990, 308).58   The most important
practical consequence of the Untersuchungsmaximei is, that the administrative
court regularly orders the files of the administrative proceedings to be produced
in the courtroom (Rüsken 1995). The Untersuchungsmaxime thus provides
                                                                                                                               
roughly as “administrative procedures laws”).  The lower courts argued that the THA’s sales
activities were in line with the VwGO, however, the definitiong of what an administrative act
is, is embodied in 35 VwVfG.
56VG Berlin (19 December 1990) NJW 1991, 376-379.
57OVG (22 January 1991) ZIP 1991, 198.
58 Authors translation. The original reads, “um die aus der subordinationsrechtlichen Struktur
des zwischen Buerger und Verwaltung bestehenden Rechtsverhaeltnisses folgenden
Unlgeichheit zu beseitigen.”20
judges with far greater discretion in the collection of information.  For example,
judges may question witnesses or collect adminitrative information on topics
not  directly raised in the pleadings.  The Untersuchungsmaxime “gives
legitimacy to the questioning of the parties by a judge in cases where the
complexity of the situation makes it unlikely that that the parties themselves will
provide all the information necessary to reach a decision” (Smid 1990, 309).59
By declaring that the THA's privatization decision belonged in the domain
of the civil courts, the High Administrative Court of Berlin significantly limited
the oversight the THA.   A consequence of the decision is that it it placed a
premium on internal monitoring by the agency.   Judges in civil courts are
limited in their review of the procedures and decision-making processes that
inform the privatization decision. They can not, for instance, look into the
administrative files of other bidders in order to judge the fairness of the
process.   For both substantive and procedural reasons, the characterization
of the THA's privatization activities as private law gave the THA the greatest
room to maneuver and define for itself how it wished to create private property.
Although the THA affected the regional development of an economy with its
privatization decision, the basis of legal standing and action were limited to the
dissemination of a private good by the state.     Manfred Balz, head of the THA
's legal department, confirmed the point, "It is clear that we (Treuhandanstalt)
favored the private law position in our arguments and actions throughout all the
legal proceedings because this status made our life much easier. I have always
said that it would be one of the biggest mistakes if we were subject to the full
control of the administrative courts. . .  we clearly triumphed. Even the majority
of legal scholarship has come to our side. There are hardly any more cases
calling for us to appear before the administrative courts."60
In addition to privatization the THA was also charged with a trustee role
with respect to its subsidiary firms.  The next section considers the THA's legal
identity as trustee or parent company to its firms.
                                           
59 Author’s translation of the following: "eigene Fragen des Richters an die Parteien zu
legitimieren, die in solchen Verfahren angebracht sind, in denen aufgrund der komplexen
Voraussetzungen des streitigen Rechts zu erwarten ist, das die Parteien nicht von sich aus
die entscheidungserheblichen Tatsachen vortragen koennen."
60Author’s translation. The original reads: "Es ist klar, dass wir unserer Argumentation und in
unseren Aktionen, bis hin zu den Prozessen, uns auf die privatrechtliche, rein zivilrechliche
Sicht gestellt haben, weil sie uns das Leben wesentlich leichter macht.  Ich habe immer
gesagt, es wäre ein GAU, größter anzunehmender Unfall, wenn wir einer vollen
verwaltungsrichtlichen Kontrolle unterworfen waeren. . . wir haben in dieser Frage, sagen
wir mal, gesiegt, auch in der Mehrheitsmeinung der Literatur." (Balz interview).21
4.2 Internal Legal Character
Under the Treuhand Act, the agency is charged with privatizing firms and
managing them: that is, restructuring them to make them competitive or, if
necessary, sell off their parts in a liquidation process.   Initially this meant
managing over 8000 large conglomerates61 employing over 4 million people.
The enormous task raises questions concerning the legal identity of the agency
with respect to firms.  Was the THA a corporate holding company subject to the
rules governing corporations in Germany or did it remain a public entity even in
its activities as manager of firms?  It should be noted at the outset that this is
perhaps the most complicated aspect of the THA's legal identity.  Given the
constraints of this conference paper I can provide only an overview of the major
issues, strategies and conclusions.
The strategy of the agency was to establish a special legal identity that
would give subsidiary firms more autonomy than, for example, regional offices
in a bureaucracy. On the other hand, the THA did not wish to lose control in
ways that might impair the privatization process. The outcome is a mixture of
private and public law that varies depending on the type of action the THA
takes with respect to its firms.  The following considers the three most important
areas of action: control and oversight; reorganization and closure; and
financing and liabilities.
4.2.1 Control and Oversight
The Treuhand's control over subsidiary firms is akin to a private holding
company and follows Germany’s private corporate law with several important
caveats.   The following considers three aspects of oversight.
First, in contrast to American firms, a holding company’s influence over its
subsidiary firm is quite limited in Germany.  Influence is exercised through the
control over the installation of company managers in the case of limited
partnership (§46 Nr. 5 GmbHG) or through the installation (and firing) of an
executive oversight committee of a stock-holding company (§101 I, 103 I AktG).
The executive committee, in turn, chooses a managing committee to run the
firm. The owner (THA) can only exercise influence indirectly, through the
leadership of the committee.
                                           
61After the firms were broken into smaller pieces the number totaled over 13000.22
Such an oversight arrangement generates a mix of results.  The THA is
clearly in  a position to exert influence and has on numerous occassions.62  For
example, in the case of the privatization of Electro Apparat Werk (EAW) in
Berlin the former manager of the firm had been recruited and installed by the
THA.  He was extremely critical of the THA's intervention into his affairs
through the Executive Committee. Information concerning the important actions
in the firm were immediately passed through to the THA.  He noted:
“In the firm you had an executive committee, manager and owner.
However the owner, the THA, also sat on the executive committee.
There was therefore a clear line of information going to the central
office (THA).  Moreover the executive committee did not operate like  a
normal executive committee since the owner’s influence was great.
The agency began to play a greater and greater role in the functioning
of the firm.“
In addition, this indirect arrangement allowed the THA to remain a
comfortable distance from the difficult decisions and consequences of the firm
without losing control. The THA could, in a sense, blame the company's
management for the firm's poor performance while also saddling the
management with the difficult task of reducing the work force.  
A final feature of this arrangement is that it placed enormous weight on the
executive committee or firm management to act as the controller for the THA.
THA employees I spoke with in the Revision, the internal controlling
department of the THA as well as firm managers,  noted that this was perhaps
the most vulnerable aspect of the arrangement with respect to control since
executive committees are often staffed with management of competitive
industries in the West or through close personal contacts with Treuhand
managment.63  Although the executive committees were put in place by the
THA, interviews with THA employees suggest that the executive committees
quickly shed their agent position and often became the principals of the firm
management.  Alternatively, a competitor serving on the board of a THA firm
may have the interests of his primary employer rather than the THA's in mind.64
Privatization agents often stood in opposition to Executive Committees who
sided with firm management against the THA.  Such an arrangement places in
                                           
62For additional examples see FAZ (18 Nov. 1991, 18); FAZ (3 Dec. 1991, 19); FAZ (5 May
1992, 15); Die Welt (5 May 1992, 16)
63 According to internal control workers, the THA’s policy of picking a person to head the
executive committee and then leaving it up to her to fill the rest of the position exacerbated
this problem.
64 A firm manager I spoke with who was also asked by Birgit Breuel to serve on an executive
board of another company explains his experience with executive committee like this: “We
(the THA) begged to the West German buinesses to lone us some managers.  So what did
the West German businesses do? They said to their managers, ‘You go over to the THA for
a short time and see what there is in our branch.  See if there is something for us and if we
can get at it.  If we are unable to get it then make sure it is leveled.’ I know this is what
happened I saw it. ”23
to question the effectiveness of the Executive Committee to act as effective
controller of THA firms.
Second, the Treuhandhandgesetz is treated in the courts as an "Economic
Steering Law"  ("Wirschaftslenkungsgesetzes") and thus falls under the Veto
Law ("Verbotsgesetz").65 Under §134 BGB, one can intervene directly in the
activities of a company if that company's activities violate the intent of a law.66
In the case of the THA, the holding company was allowed to intervene into the
activities of its subsidiary firms if the activities are determined to hinder the
THG, that is privatization.   In practice the law did not provide the THA
necessarily with a direct line of control over its subsidiary firms.  Rather it was a
justificiation for “passive” control (still exerted through management) or the
exercise of the THA’s power to veto certain spending decisions made in the
firm.67    To make substantive changes the THA had to intervene through the
Executive Committee or management.
Third, because the THA is a federal public entity it is subject to budgetary
laws § 112 II BHO68 and §§ 53 and 54 HGrG  which establish a number of
reporting requirements not typical for a private agency.  However, because the
THA can take actions only through a firm's management, these reporting
requirements are made the responsibility of the executive committee in the
company or the manager.  In other words the burden to report is placed on the
firms.  Reports include information about the internal organization of the
company, balance sheets, and the production processes.  The information is
then passed on to the THA who in turn must make the information available to
the Federal Auditors' Office ("Bundesrechnunghof").  A important question is
what the Auditors’ Office can do with the information. (Diederich et. al 1994)
point out that it was unclear for quite awhile whether the Federal Auditors’
Office could perform audits on THA subsidiaries under German corporate law.
It was later established through action by the Bundestag that they could.
                                           
65§ 134 BGB. The civil law's most best known application is Germany's infamous store closing
hours.
66 Under §134 BGB, the basic effect is the following: If I enter into a contract that violates the
law, this contract may be null and void.  But if I buy something in Germany after the  closing
hour the contract per se is not necessarily null and void.  But I have in the course of my
purchase violated another law which justifies intervention.
67 I spoke with several Begleiter (person charged with the administration or guidance of the
firms) who said this distinction was extremely important.  One stated,  “The management of
the firms had to get approval from us (Treuhand) for expenditures over a certain amount.
However, we could not directly influece the firm to take a certain strategy.”.
68§ 112 II BHO applies when, "ein Unternehmen in der Rechtsform einer bundesunmittelbaren
juristischen Person des öffentlichen Rechts an einem Unternehmen in der Rechtsform einer
juristischen Person des Privatrechts unmittelbar oder mittelbar mit Mehrheit beteiligt ist, die
§§ 53 and 54 HGrG entsprechend."24
4.2.2 Reorganization and Closure69
In fulfilling its mandate under the Treuhand Act70, the THA was often forced to
split up a large conglomerate in easier-to-sell pieces and/or close the operation
of firms determined no longer capable of being saved.71    In both instances the
THA was treated as the majority shareholder (Allein oder
Mehrheitsgesellschafter) and the laws under which the agency took action to
restructure or close firms fell under private law.
In the case of closure, the designation of the firm as unsalvageable was
considered an administrative act (§43 II VwGO) challengeable in the
Administrative Courts.  However, once the evaluation was completed the THA -
- as the majority shareholder -- could decide to place the firm into liquidation
(§262 I,2 AktG, §60 I, 2, GmbHG) under private law.  In this sense, the
procedures reflected the two-stage theory mentioned above.   The restructuring
or splitting up of firms by the THA was made easier by the passage of the
Splitting Law in April 1991 by increasing the rights of owners of THA firms.  The
law essentially placed the decision to reorganize in the realm of private law.
Similar to the rules on closure, the THA as majority owner of its firms could
choose to restructure them if it was determined to be economically necessary
by a recognized expert.
4.2.3 Financing and Liability
Treuhand firms that were deemed as "restructurable" by the THA initially
required large subsidies  to overcome the liquidity crisis brought about by the
Social, Economic and Currency Union (July 1, 1990) and the collapse of East
European markets.  An important legal issue concerning the leadership in the
THA was the agency's legal designation with respect to the financing of firms
and the potential liability the THA was exposed to through its firms. The issue
centered on whether the THA and its subsidiaries was a qualified actual
company "qualifizierte faktischer Konzern"72; or whether the agency was a
public bureaucracy subject to §34 of the German Constitution.  The distinction
had enormous implications for the agency and the government.
If the THA and its subsidiary companies constituted a private company, the
THA was potentially required to compensate subsidiary firms for their losses at
the point at which the relationship between holding and firm ended.  It would
have essentially given the firms a license to operate without any fiscal checks.
                                           
69For more on the topic of closure see (Weimar 1993).
70§ 8 I TreuhG
71Determined through an expert's certified opinion and evaluation.
72 A qualifizierte faktischer Konzern is the conglomerate  consisting of the controlling company
and one or more controlled companies that is treated like the conglomerate falling under
§312 AktG without being one (see(Wolter 1992)).25
This prompted Manfred Balz to note that the law made it practically impossible
for a daughter company to go bankrupt. Second, as a private firm, the THA was
potentially liable for the actions of its firms.  Creditors filing against firms
claiming compensation would have a right to attach claims on the THA and, in
turn, the German government. And third, as a private corporation, the THA
would be required to bring the capital reserve of subsidiary companies in line
with rules governing stock-holding and limited partnership firms. The capital
requirement for limited partnerships and stock-holding companies is DM 50,000
and DM 100,000 respectively.  Of course firms received much more than that.
However, the enormous deficits firms operated under would have meant that
bringing them automatically in line with capital requirements would in practice
have constituted a much greater uncontrolled transfer of public money.
Management in the THA (Breuel, Balz, Vonnemann) argued vehemently
that the agency was not a corporation under §312 AktG.73  They argued two
points that reflected a broader ideology in the agency. First, they pointed out
that §Art 312 assumes a relationship between two companies.  Although a
government corporation is capable of being considered a private actor,74 it is
far from clear that the THA was a company.  A company pursues a private set
of goals, primarily profit. The THA's goal was the redevelopment and recovery
of an entire economy: clearly a public not private good. (Vonnemann 1991)
noted, "The fact that the agency acts in a "business-like" way should not make
one confuse it with an actual business."  Second, the relationship between a
holding company and its subsidiary firms in the private sense assumes that a
holding company has the ability and interest in  exercising power over its
firms.75  Officials in the agency argued that the THA was in no position to
exercise that type of control. Moreover, the control it did exercise was indirect
and limited to the installation of managers and executive committees.
In sum, the relationship between the THA and its subsidiary firms occupies
a special position in German Law (Sonderrecht) that crosses public and private
law, as well as, German corporate (AG) and limited-partnership (GmbH) law.76
If the THA were a public company like the Germany's Telecom AG, the agency
would fall clearly under German stock company law (Weimar 1991, 819).
                                           
73 Balz noted, “The THA has been characterized in the legal literature and in selective cases,
as having direct responsibility for its firms.  In the interest of insuring the THA’s
effectiveness and the protection of public money, we must fight against this.” Translated
from:   "In der rechtswissenschaftlichen Literatur und in vereinzelten Prozessen wird die
THA als für Verbindlichkeiten ihrer Beteiligungsunternehmen unmittlebar oder mittelbar
verantworlich angesehen. Diesen Auffassungen ist im Interesse unserer Handlungsfähigkeit,
d.h. der THA, und der Schonung oeffentlicher Mittel energisch entgegenzutreten." (Balz
1992, 446).
74Decision in the German High Court established the possibility that a government entity could
also be considered a private company (BGH, Urt. , 13 Oct. 1977, BGHZ 69, 334)
75"Ausübung einheitlicher Leitung der herrschenden Gesellschaft in bezug auf die
Konzernunternehmen." (Vonnemann 1991).
76For several excellent accounts see (Timm 1991),(Weimar 1991)(Weimar 1993).26
However, as Manfred Balz (Balz 1992, 447) notes, "The THA and its subsidiary
firms do not constitute a company . . . because its mandate does not affect a
single private economic entity but an entire economy" (emphasis in original).77
The connection of firms to the Treuhand was, therefore considered  a
temporary formality.
The result was a reinforcement of the legal distance between the agency
and its firms while strengthening the agency's control over its subsidiaries.  The
THA was given greater discretion over the use of subsidies such as loan
guarantees, relief of “old debt”78 and an infusion of capital under 24 DMBilG79.
At the same time, the agency was also shielded from exposure to the liabilities
and responsibilities of a private holding company and could therefore operate
with greater freedom. As one former employee80  charged with special internal
investigations within Treuhand put it, "The agency had the best of both worlds.
It enjoyed the flexibility and autonomy of a private actor without any of the
liabilities.  It enjoyed the backing and status of public agency without having to
fight out every privatization decision in the administrative courts."
5. Conclusion
The legal identity of the agency does not explain why the agency embarked on
its particular course to privatization.  However, it does help us understand why
the agency was able to follow its course so resolutely.  The THA is very much
an anomoly.  As one person I interviewed said, “It’s unlikely we’ll have another
unification soon.”   However, it is precisely because of its unique nature that the
agency is worth considering in a more general way.  What are the conditions
that contribute to radical institutional change?   What is it that allowed the
agency to maintain its course and close shop despite the external interests and
institutional mechanisms one would expect to steer the agency off track?  One
                                           
77Die THA und die ihr zugeordneten Unternehmen bilden keinen Konzern. Die THA ist kein
Unternhemen im spezifisch konzernrechtlichen Sinne der Art 15ff AktG, da sie nicht einen
privatwirtschaftlichen, sondern einen gesamtwirtschaftlichten betstimmten auftrage hat."
78This refers to the debt firms had on the books of East Germany's banks prior to 1989.  After
the fall of the Berlin Wall the East German banks were taken over by their West German
counterpart The debt was then owned to West German banks at the new currency rate of  1
East Mark to 1 West Mark.
79Opening Balance Sheet Act  (22 Sept. 1990).  Forced East German firms to report their
companies assets and debits.  The report was then used by the THA as a very rough guide
for dispersing liquidity. Initially this was done very broadly. Later the THA attempted to
evaluate each firm.
80Interviewee worked in the Treuhand for three years moving up the ranks to Abteilungsleiter.
He worked in privatization, evaluation of firms and internal controls. His longest position was
as a special investigator in the internal controls division of the agency.27
conclusion from this paper is that grey areas in the law open up possibilities for
outcomes counter to what one would predict.
In the case of the Treuhand, placing the decisions concerning privatization
in the civil courts insured the agency the greatest degree of freedom.  Waigel
and Breuel's claim that the Treuhand did not perform structural politics, despite
all evidence to the contrary, was far more easy to defend in the context of
private law.  Civil courts assume the judge is playing the role of referee
between two equals.  As a result, both plaintiffs and judges are far more
constrained in their search for evidence and documentation from the defendent.
Moreover, the standards by which the agency is held accountable are those of
any private individual or group.
Correspondingly, the position of the internal character in the administrative
courts and public law insured that the agency could maintain control without
taking on the  responsibility of a private holding company.  It is obvious, as
scholars have pointed out, that the Treuhand was in no position
organizationally to oversee its firms and was therefore in no position to be held
accountable according to corporate law.  On the other hand, the Treuhand did
make its presence felt particularly in the medium-to-large firms.  However, the
presence was limited primarily to questions of privatization. For instance, a
company that embarked upon a plan to reinvest and reorganize itself was often
told it had to wait until it had been sold.  "The Treuhand's strategy was to keep
firms on the line for as minimal as possible" said one THA director matter a
factly.  Such a course could only be maintained if the state was free from the
requirements and liabilities of a private holding company.28
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